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Abstract 
Industrial systems are often large, and complex, in terms of structure, dynamic 
interactions between subsystems and components, dynamic operational environment, 
ageing, etc. The dynamic reliability approach is a convenient framework to model the 
behavior of such systems. However, there is a price to pay, e.g. in terms of amount of 
data, size of state graphs, volume of reliability calculations, and combination of various 
engineering activities. A sound Systems Engineering process, benefiting from the 
improvement of most recent tools, may be a fruitful approach to decrease these 
difficulties. Although feasibility demonstrations have been done for conventional, static, 
approaches of dependability, interoperability between dynamic reliability modeling and 
Systems Engineering has not the same maturity level. The article explains how, on the 
basis of Systems Engineering (SE) process definitions, a Meta-model defines a 
framework for integrating the safety into SE processes. It supports a “hub automaton”, 
that is the key element for interoperability with the tools and activities required for a 
dynamic reliability assessment. The case study is the dynamic assessment of 
availability of a feed-water control system in a power plant steam generator, presented 
in previous articles. 
Keywords: Systems engineering, systems modeling, RAMS, dynamic dependability 
assessment, dynamic reliability, interoperability. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Feasibility demonstrations and significant studies 
have been done to demonstrate the feasibility and 
benefits of an interoperability between System 
Engineering frameworks and Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) activities ([David, 
2010], [Aboutaleb, 2012]). However, these studies 
considered only so called “static” dependability 
approaches, assuming an invariant structure of the 
system. It focuses on “events combinations” with 
models like FMEA, static Fault Trees and Event 
Trees. Considering the system dynamics requires 
“dynamic” dependability approaches, focusing on 
event sequences with models like Dynamic Fault 
Trees, Boolean Driven Markov Processes…, and in 
term of Meta-model, a semantic adapted to the 
system behavior. 
Improvement of the completeness of assessment of 
large and complex industrial systems, requires these 
“dynamic” dependability approaches, since they 
cover a wider range of phenomena. Given this 
context, the problematic is to develop meta-models 
integrated in a proven Systems Engineering (SE) 
process ([SE 2010], [IEEE, 2005], [ISO/CEI 26702, 
2007], [ISO/CEI 15288, 2008]), properly combined 
with RAMS engineering activities, including dynamic 
modeling, and benefiting from recent support tools. 
A SE process implemented in a consistent platform 
helps the engineer to manage the processes 
(description of functional and physical architectures, 
allocation of functions, preliminary assessment of 
requirements...) which are necessary, upstream of 
the dependability study. Then, it is possible to 
describe the failure features of the components, to 
model realistic failure/repairing scenarios and to 
define redundancy policies and dynamical allocation 
of functions caused by failure events. To do that, an 
idea is to develop a “hub automaton”, that supports 
the translation of the dynamic model into specific 
dynamic dependability tools. 
This article is organized into four main sections:  
1. Definitions and theoretical framework. We define 
the fundamental concepts for the study, e.g. 
System Engineering (SE), RAMS Activities and 
Hybrid System. 
2. Principles. We present the key elements on 
which this demonstration is based: choice of 
interoperability vs. integration, System 
Engineering process supported by a Meta-model, 
Dynamic Reliability approach. 
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3. Method description. This section describes the 
processes and data used in the method and the 
Meta-model developed to support them. 
4. Case Study. The case study is focused on the 
availability of a feed-water control system in a 
power plant steam generator. The meta-model is 
instantiated for specifying a sub-system, a 
dynamic model is generated for describing its 
behavior and an availability assessment is 
performed on it. 
1. Definitions and theoretical framework 
1.1. Systems Engineering 
SE consists in concurrent interdisciplinary 
approaches for the design and validation of complex 
technical systems. The process proposed by 
INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook [SE, 
2010], integrates all the disciplines and specialty 
groups, e.g. RAMS, into a team effort that focuses 
on defining customer needs and required 
functionality early in the development cycle, 
documenting requirements, and then proceeding 
with design synthesis and system validation. 
1.2. RAMS activities 
RAMS acronym refers to a set of engineering 
activities aiming to perform Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety assessments, based on 
deterministic and probabilistic approaches. INCOSE 
Handbook [SE 2010] refers to Availability, Reliability, 
Maintainability and Supportability (RAMS), also 
known as dependability. The dependability of a 
system describes its ability to fulfill the required 
functions under given conditions, considering 
degradation of performance due to failure and 
maintenance. RAMS studies are considered in this 
case study, as validations, as defined by [ISO 9000: 
2005], based on modeling and focused on 
dependability requirements. 
1.3. System complexity 
A technical system may be considered at the highest 
abstraction level, as a structured set of variable 
elements, acting in a technical environment for an 
explicit purpose. In the RAMS engineering domain, it 
is interesting to characterize its complexity by the 
combination of two attributes: “interactive 
complexity” and “tight coupling” [Perrow, 85]. 
Interactive complexity results from presence of 
dynamic phenomena, occurrence of rare event 
sequences and non-linear effects. The consequence 
is a risk of incomplete knowledge of the system.  
Tight coupling results from strong interdependence 
between phenomena. The consequence is a risk of 
dependent failures, e.g. common-cause and 
cascade failures. 
 
1.4. Hybrid System 
System that combines continuous physical 
processes, deterministic event sequences (defined 
by specifications), random events (that may be 
intrinsic, like failures, or extrinsic, like unexpected 
context modification). 
1.5. Dynamic Dependability, Dynamic Reliability 
Dynamic Dependability is a branch of dependability 
engineering that deals with "the influence of time, 
process dynamics, and human actions, on system 
operations and failures, and accidental scenarios." 
[Brissaud, 2011]. Discrete Dynamic dependability 
approaches rely on models like Dynamic Fault 
Trees, Boolean Driven Markov Processes… 
Hybrid dependability approaches permit to improve 
the modeling of hybrid systems as they consider also 
the multiple interactions between deterministic and 
random discrete events, and continuous processes. 
The mathematical framework derives from 
Kolmogorov-Chapman equations [Labeau, Smidts, 
2000]. Its applicationconsists basically in the 
modeling or the simulation of Piecewise 
Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMP) [Dufour, 
2002]. Exact analytical solutions of stochastic 
differential equations are complex and require, 
beyond a small system size, simplifying 
assumptions, whereas approximation (using 
numerical methods or by Monte Carlo simulations) 
allow realistic modeling and provide data for 
comprehensive statistical analysis. It is very useful to 
apply this framework in the case of software 
intensive hybrid systems, as it explicitly considers 
the interactions between system states and context 
evolutions that may represent the most contributing 
risk factor to system failures [Leveson, 2011]. 
In addition to consideration of hybrid dynamic 
dependability, the so called dynamic reliability 
assume that some continuous phenomena (like for 
example, ageing), are influenced by stochastic 
events or drifts. It means that some reliability 
characteristics are influenced by the process. 
2. Principles 
2.1. Interoperability vs. Integration 
Designing a complex system require a set of 
activities in interaction (Figure 1). This set is 
practically an organizational system and its 
management has to consider in particular the 
exchanges of data between the activities. At this 
point, a decision has to be done between 
‘knowledge integration’ and ‘knowledge 
interoperation’ [Léger, 2009]. 
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Figure 1: Activities in interaction for a real 
system 
Knowledge integration consists in modeling the 
different activities of a system through a shared 
semantics (Figure 2). As such, the modeling focuses 
on knowledge extracted from each of the studied 
activities. The difficulty is to limit the loss of 
knowledge representation due to a common 
semantic.  
 
Figure 2 : An "integrated" model 
Knowledge interoperation consists in using neutral 
exchange formalism as a “pivot” or “hub” for the 
interaction between the different activities (Figure 3). 
As such, a large amount of specific knowledge is 
kept in each activity. 
 
Figure 3: An "interoperable" model 
For the case study presented here, the choice is to 
move towards an interoperation of the models 
through a dedicated Systems Engineering platform. 
2.2. Choice of a Meta-model as a framework 
In software engineering and systems engineering, a 
Data Model, or Meta-model, is a structured collection 
of "concepts" (things, terms, etc.) within a given 
knowledge domain. A model complies with a Meta-
model in the way that a computer program complies 
with the grammar of the programming language in 
which it is written. The modeling language is used to 
manage diversity of objects types and their 
relationship, such as hierarchical, 
production/consumption... The properties of each 
type of object are defined by attributes. In this 
demonstration, the Meta-model allows to manage a 
large quantity of heterogeneous data. 
In order to implement and support an innovative 
Meta-model for dynamic reliability, we used arKItect 
Designer, a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) tool 
having relevant capabilities for this demonstration: 
1. Ready to use. As the SE framework is 
predefined, it was easy to design a Meta-model 
from scratch, estimated in the range of 10 to 30 
times faster that with classical Object-Oriented 
(OO) approaches. 
2. Interpretation. The Meta-model and the model 
can be modified dynamically, both are displayed 
in parallel in real time. This enables a fast 
prototyping of the Meta-model that seems more 
questionable, with other platforms where 
recompilation is needed after each modification of 
the Meta-model. 
3. Generation of customizable building block 
diagrams. It allows getting immediately graphical 
editing views for all the artifacts needed in the 
design. 
4. Easy to use. This tool does not require a high 
level of competence in Object Oriented 
approaches and programming to design a 
specific Meta-model. The rules for using the tool 
are rather simple and an engineer can build his 
data model and concentrate fairly on his own 
domain of activity. 
5. Completeness. It is possible to represent in the 
meta-model all the artifacts needed to describe 
the system, as for example, stochastic automata. 
2.3. Choice of a dynamic model 
In a previous study, modeling the availability of a 
feed-water control system (considered as hybrid) in 
a power plant steam generator, the feasibility of two 
complementary approaches has been demonstrated 
[Aubry et al., 2012]. 
One approach models the system with Stochastic 
Hybrid Automaton (SHA) presented in [Babykina, 
2011] and [Castaneda, 2011]. Analysis of the model 
may be quantitative, with Monte Carlo Simulations, 
to make dependability assessments; or qualitative, 
with technique of sequence exploration, to find 
sequences having a length inferior to a given criteria. 
The other approach, presented in [Zhang, 2012], 
models the system with State Charts and a 
dedicated COTS (Matlab/Simulink). The analysis of 
the model is quantitative, with Monte Carlo 
simulations  
Activity A Activity B
Activity C
REAL SYSTEM
Activity A
Activity B
Activity C
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF THE SYSTEM
Shared semantics
Activity A
Activity B
Activity C
AN INTEROPERABLE MODEL OF THE SYSTEM
Neutral exchange 
formalism
 Page 4/10 
Both approaches require a combination of various 
engineering activities, the use of computational 
power, a large volume of data, component level 
models, and exchange between various tools 
(Matlab, Scilab…). 
This demonstration focuses on the interoperability 
between SE process and a dynamic modeling based 
on SHA. SHA allow the exploration of event 
sequences and model checking, which is an 
interesting feature for dependability studies. 
Furthermore, EDF R&D has the disposition of an 
internally developed open source tool, Pycatshoo, 
also based on SHA [Chraïbi, 2013].   
3. Method description 
3.1. Specification of RAMS/SE interoperability 
Dependability assessment requires a coupling 
between SE and the various RAMS activities. 
However, there is in practice sometimes a 
discontinuity between the system design and the 
dependability studies because they are considered 
lately in the project development. Functional analysis 
has to be performed during the system design 
phase, but it has also sometimes to be performed 
again during the dependability analysis, especially if 
the engineering framework does not consider 
RAMS/SE interoperability. Moreover, SE and RAMS 
teams often use tools that are not interoperating. 
This may lead to incoherence between the functional 
analysis and the failure analysis. 
In a context of hybrid systems, interoperability 
between SE and RAMS engineering processes, is 
critical and must start early in the system life cycle. 
Their interoperability deserves particular attention all 
over the development process. Thus, it is needed to 
clearly specify the RAMS/SE interoperability on 
following points: 
• Stages of the SE process, 
• Stages of the RAMS process, 
• Relations between the processes, 
• Documentation to be generated. A tool such 
as ArKItect facilitates the production of 
systems and dependability studies. It can 
easily be used to provide diverse 
customizable views on the system and its 
dependability aspects. 
3.2. Detailed Description of RAMS/SE 
interoperability 
For this case study, [SE 2010] interpretation in the 
arKItect environment has led to the definition of a 
process divided into two sub-processes (see Figure 
10, in appendix): (1) System Specifications (SS) and 
(2) System Design (SD).  
The SS sub-process contains: 
- Analysis of customer needs, detailed in terms of 
system lifecycle and mission phases, 
requirements statement, functions identification 
and context contributions definition tasks. 
- Functional Architecture stage. It consists of 
requirements and functions refinement, definition 
of sub-functional flow exchanges. During this 
stage, the specification activity is iterative; 
allocating requirements upon functions allows 
the emergence of system sub-functions and 
requires the refining of requirements into sub-
requirements. 
The system Design (SD) sub-process contains: 
- System Architecture (SA) stage. It consists in 
defining system components, functions 
allocation to components, definition of physical 
interfaces allocation of flows, and allocation of 
requirements to components.  
Refinement Feedback. Based on the 
requirements allocation upon systems, it insures 
with reasonable certainty, that the selected 
system architecture is adequate, given a 
“reasonable certainty” , with the  requirements 
produced from the Customer Needs Analysis 
stage. The allocation of design requirements to 
the system components can lead to the 
generation of further functional requirements. 
The assessment of the “reasonable certainty” is 
the purpose of the risk assessment processes 
done in parallel. 
The arKItect environment also covers Dependability 
studies and is divided into two sub-processes: (3) 
Preliminary Risk Analysis (PRA) and (4) System 
Risk Analysis (SRA). PRA is linked to the functions 
definition in the System Specifications stage. It 
includes:  
- System state definition 
- System risk event identification 
- Undesired Customer Event (UCE) identification 
the preliminary risk analysis, where risks are 
linked to functions and priorized.  
SRA is linked to the internal functional analysis from 
the SE process. It includes: 
- ”Static” analysis such as Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). FTA risk events and 
basic risk events are identified in the System 
Architecture resulting from the SE process. 
- For this case study, dynamic assessments 
capabilities have been added, through 
interoperability. 
Results are capitalized into the arKItect project 
database and they are compared with safety and 
reliability requirements elicited previously in System 
Specification phase. ArKItect includes Python 
scripting language that ensures interfacing between  
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System Engineering platform and  analysis tools, like 
for example, Fault trees analyzing tools and 
availability estimation tools. Another scripting 
application is the report generation for project 
deliveries. 
3.3. Data and data management for dependability 
study 
The Approdyn case study [Deleuze, 2011], deals 
with data relevant for Dependability studies, like 
system states, failure modes, availability, 
reparability, reliability …  
The various data required for the dependability 
studies may be structured as follows: 
• Functional description of the system 
(elements, context, operating conditions, 
states…). 
• Qualitative and quantitative reliability data at 
element level, including failure modes, wear 
out and dynamic phenomena, state graphs 
(figure 4)… 
• Models of the physical phenomena of 
interest for the RAMS studies of the system 
(including normal and possible abnormal 
conditions) and relevant control logic. 
• Fault Tolerance Features (redundancy 
policy, defense in depth…). 
• Qualitative and quantitative RAMS data at 
system level, including Operation and 
Maintenance procedures, Periodic Testing. 
 
The challenge is to manage object relationships 
(like allocation, production, consumption, etc.) in 
interoperable SE and RAMS processes. 
 
Figure 4: Example of state graph for one element 
of the steam generator  
 
The SE process implementation requires managing 
project data relating to requirements, functional and 
physical architecture. 
A graphical representation tool like arKItect proposes 
a solution for both efficient and seamless SE and 
RAMS processes. Indeed, the model is based on the 
system architecture, that means all activities related 
to the system design and to the dependability 
analysis are gathered in the same representation 
space. 
3.4. The Meta-model for interoperability 
 
Existing meta-models for SE, like [Pfister, 2012], 
organize the data and support the SE processes 
defined by INCOSE standard. However, they 
consider only the normal, faultless, operation of the 
system, whereas for critical systems safety and 
dependability matter too. Thus, the Meta-model 
defined by [Pfister, 2012], has been extended to be 
able to represent Dependability into SE processes. 
[Piriou, 2013] and [Piriou, 2014] describe in detail the 
design of this extension.  
The meta-model proposed in this study adds the 
semantics required to perform dependability 
analyses on phased mission systems with repairable 
multistate components. The meta-model is 
represented by an UML class diagram [SysML, 
2007]. 
It supports the development of a “hub automaton” or 
”pivotal automaton”, comparable to a Guarded 
Transition System [Rauzy, 2008], which is the key 
element for interoperability between the tools and 
activities needed for dynamic reliability assessment. 
Figure 5 presents the meta-model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Complete meta-model for the 
integration of dependability analyzes into SE 
processes [Piriou, 2013] 
 
It includes the following aspects: 
 
Phased missions. A phased mission system is 
characterized by a structure, failure and recovery 
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processes, and success criteria that can change 
from one phase to another. 
Component States. Each component can be 
activated and can fail according to several operation 
and failure modes. These modes represent 
respectively the functional and dysfunctional 
properties of the component. A component state is a 
pair built with one operation mode and one failure 
mode. Thus, possible states of a component are 
defined by instantiating its failure and operation 
modes. 
The resulting class diagram enables to model the 
stochastic evolutions of the component in the form of 
transitions from a state to another. These transitions 
are due to failure or repair events that occur with a 
probability law depending on rates defined for the 
considered state. 
It is assumed here that these rates do not depend on 
time. Thus the scope of the model to represent 
dynamic aspects of dependability is not fulfilled and 
will require further developments.  
 
Effects of component states on function 
achievement. It is assumed, that the achievement of 
a function is quantifiable. This means that the 
achievement percentage can be computed for every 
function from the knowledge of the current states of 
its allocated component. For instance, the 
achievement percentage of a function whose aim is 
to fill in a tank and for which two identical pumps are 
allocated is equal to 100% when the two pumps are 
faultless and 60% when one pump is leaking. 
 
Redundancy policies. The set of components 
allocated to a function can changes during 
operation; redundancy policies specify these 
changes. The “Redundancy policy” class and its 
relations are introduced in the meta-model. Also, two 
methods are added to the “Function” class that 
updates the allocation attribute of the “Function” 
class. The “Redundancy policy” class permits to 
specify how the faulty components are replaced by 
redundant components. 
 
3.5. Systematic generation of a dynamic model 
 
For describing the dysfunctional behavior of the 
system, we have developed an algorithm for building 
a dynamic model from an instance of this meta-
model, in a generic way. Since the Stochastic 
Guarded Transition System (SGTS), defined by 
[Rauzy, 2008], allows a permissive and compact 
description of the system, we chose it as the 
formalism for representing this dynamic model. 
Moreover, the respect of best practices for using this 
formalism leads to constructions which preserve the 
structure aspect of the system. This conservation of 
data complies relevantly with the interoperability 
purpose. 
A SGTS is defined as a 7-uplet <V,E,π,T,i,H,B> 
where: 
• V is a set of variables 
• E is a set of symbols called avents 
• π is a priority function (a mapping of events to 
non-negative integers) 
• T is a set of transitions, i.e. of triple <G,e,P>, 
where: 
o G is a guard (a Boolean expression built over V) 
o E is an event 
o P is a post-condition (an instruction built over V) 
• i is an assignment called the initial assignment (a 
mapping from the set of variables to the set of 
values). 
• H and B are two possibly empty instructions 
called respectively the head and body parts of the 
assertion. 
The instructions can be seen as a mapping from 
assignments to assignments. 
A transition 

→ is fireable in a state (an 
assignment) , if it validates the guard  and if the fix 
point (	(())) exists, i.e. there is an integer  
such that (	(())) = (	(())). The firing 
of this transition consists in three steps:  
• First, the post-condition  of the transition is 
performed. 
• Second, the head part of the assertion 	 is 
performed 
• Finally, the body part of the assertion  is 
iterated until a fixpoint is reached. 
Hence, the state (	(())) is called the 
successor of  by the transition 

→. 
 
4. Case Study 
4.1. Description 
The case study is focused on the availability of a 
feed-water control system used in a power plant 
steam generator. It is described in [Deleuze, 2011]. 
The case is a classical problem of hybrid 
dependability with dynamic reliability issue. It has 
been studied e.g in France [Aubry et al., 2012], 
[Zhang, 2012], [Deleuze et al., 2011] and USA 
[NUREG 6942]. 
4.2. Instantiation of the meta-model 
 
In this article, only the sub-system composed of the 
two feeding turbo pumps (TPA, in Figure 9), are 
considered.  This sub-system has to perform only 
one function F: “Supply enough water to the steam 
generator”. The pumps may fail and be repaired. To 
increase dependability of the function, the operation 
mode of each pump must be managed dynamically 
according to redundancy policies. 
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Defining Mission Phases 
A first step is to build object diagrams on the basis of 
the meta-model. The main mission contains three 
phases (Table I). The function is mandatory in all 
phases but only one pump is needed to perform this 
function during the first and third phase. 
 
 
 
 
Table I: Phases Description 
 
Defining Component States 
Instance diagrams are used to model the 
combination of operation modes and failure modes 
(see figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Example of Instance Diagrams 
 
Figure 7 presents the quantification of the attributes 
of the State class instances. The first value (e.g. 
0.01 for the state Run-Leak) is the failure rate of the 
transition that leads to this state and the second one 
(0.1 for the same state), is the repair rate to leave 
this state. As the pumps are identical, their states 
description are similar. 
 
The contribution of one pump to the function 
depends on its state. For example, When the pump 
is disabled (operation mode OFF), this contribution is 
obviously equal to zero. This is also the case when 
the Rupture failure mode has occurred. The analysis 
is not easier for the remaining four states, especially 
as they suppose leaks, with no complete loss of 
function. Thus values of the attribute 
“achievementRate” for every state of a pump have to 
be defined (see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. States description 
 
Description of the effects of component states 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Description of the achievement rates of 
the pumps 
 
Definition of redundancy policies 
Two instance diagrams are also needed to describe 
the redundancy policy in the multiple phases. 
 
4.3. Building the dynamic model  
 
This subsection presents a large part of the SGTS 
which models the dysfunctional behavior of the 
pumps. It is built on the basis of the instance given in 
the last subsection. 
 
Defining and initializing variables 
The variables of the models are listed below: 
• Phase = P1; 
• F.goal = 60; F.isSatisfied = True; 
• TPA1.OM = Run ; TPA1.FM = OK 
• TPA2.OM = OFF ; TPA2.FM = OK 
• R1.called = False; R2.called = False 
 
Defining the transitions 
There are three transitions for changing the current 
mission phase, whose priority is 0: 
 = 1
→
  = 2	 ∧ .  ! = 100 
 = 2
→#
 = 3	 ∧ .  ! = 60 
 = 3
#→
 = 1	 ∧ .  ! = 60 
 Page 8/10 
 
There are seven stochastic transitions (not priority) 
by pump which model failure and repair occurrences. 
The values of probability rates are given by the 
Table II. Since the pumps are identical, only the 
transitions defined for the pump TPA1 are given 
below: 
&'1.() = *+ ∧
&'1.) = (,
-./.012
3.3
 &'1.) = 45 
&'1.() = *+ ∧
&'1.) = (,
-./.678976
3.33

&'1.() = ( ∧
&'1.) = *+:;+<
 
&'1.() = (=<:> ∧
&'1.) = (,
-./.012
3.3?
 &'1.) = 45 
&'1.() = (=<: ∧
&'1.) = (,
-./.6789
3.33@

&'1.() = ( ∧
&'1.) = *+:;+<
 
&'1.() = ( ∧
&'1.) = 45
-./.681A6
3.@
 &'1.) = (, 
&'1.() = *+ ∧
&'1.) = 45
-./.681A6
3.
 &'1.) = (, 
&'1.() = ( ∧
&'1.) = *+:;+<
-./.681A6
3.
 &'1.) = (, 
 
Finally, there are four priority (immediate) transitions 
by pump, which is fired for forcing one of its 
operation modes, due to a redundancy policy 
request: 
 
&'1.() = ( ∧
&'1.) = (, ∧
*1.B!!> = &<+
-./.67
 &'1.() = *+ 
 
&'1.() = *+ ∧
&'1.) = (, ∧
*2.B!!> = &<+
-./.CD6
 &'1.() = (=<:> 
 
&'1.() = *+ ∧
*1. B!!> = !
-./.EFF
 &'1.() = ( 
 
&'1.() = (=<:> ∧
*2. B!!> = !
-./.67
 &'1.() = *+ 
 
 
Defining the assertion 
The assertion aim is to compute if the function is 
satisfied and if the redundancy policies must be 
called. The head part of the assertion is sufficient, 
and the body part is reduced to the identity. 
 
H:  
. GH;GIG> ← KIIB;(&'1.(), &'1.))
M KIIB;(&'2.(),&'2.))
N .  ! 
*1. B!!> ← ( = 1 ∨  = 3)
∧  ;	. GH;GIG> 
*2. B!!> ←  = 2 ∧  ;	. GH;GIG> 
 
4.4. Contribution to System validation 
 
The last stage we performed on this case study, is 
the assessment of the availability of the pumps for 
realistic scenarios. To do this, the SGTS described 
above, has been fully implemented using the tool 
PyCATSHOO [Chraïbi, 2013]. At this step, expert 
knowledge had been integrated to the model for 
filling the lack of knowledge due to the semantic 
used for interoperability. Finally, the availability is 
assessed with a Monte Carlo simulation (figure 9). 
The result is obtained for a sequence of twelve 
identical missions where the first phase lasts 1 day, 
the second 28 days and the third 1 day. The average 
unavailability is equal to 0.62%. 
 
 
Figure 9: Unavailability of the pumps 
(x-axis : time in hours, y-axis : unavailability) 
Traceability is maintained throughout all levels of 
system model, since the early Customer Needs 
Analysis phase, that provides functional and 
dependability requirements:  
1. Allocation of System Requirements to hardware, 
software, or manual actions. 
2. Allocation of all functional and performance 
requirements or design constraints, either 
derived from or flowed down directly to 
components. 
3. Traceability of requirements from source 
documentation through the whole project life 
cycle. 
4. Traceability of the history of each requirement 
on the system is maintained and is retrievable. 
 
To bridge functional and failure analysis, the SE 
framework  used, as a starting point, the recent ISO 
26262 safety standard. It specifies how to ensure 
traceability between specification activities and those 
of validation. System validation ensures that 
requirements and system implementation provide 
the right solution to the customer needs in terms of 
functionality and dependability. 
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Conclusions 
With the extension of SE Meta-model presented in 
[Piriou, 2013], this case study describes how, from 
outputs of a SE process, a RAMS engineer can 
model realistic failure/repairing scenarios, define 
redundancy policies and dynamical allocation of 
functions caused by failure events. 
A sound SE process, supported by a tool like 
arKItect, can support the RAMS engineer to get data 
and models from the upstream processes (functional 
and physical architectures, allocation of functions, 
requirements...). It is especially helpful to manage 
the amount of data and the concurrent engineering 
activities required to assess dependability of hybrid 
systems, e.g. through traceability and capabilities to 
reconsider efficiently upstream stages of the design 
process with the output the RAMS studies. 
 A “hub automaton” support the translation of the 
dynamic dependability model into dedicated RAMS 
tools like Pycatshoo. 
This case study is a first step towards interoperability 
of Systems Engineering and dynamic RAMS studies 
Complementary studies have to be done at the hub 
automaton level to represent more hybrid aspects, 
and at RAMS models level, to improve the dynamic 
reliability modeling aspects.  
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Figure 10. Interoperable System Engineering and RAMS processes developed for the test case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
